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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Andrew Scott Gomez appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine. On appeal, he argues that the state presented insufficient evidence
to support his conviction; that the district court erred by not giving a specific unanimity
instruction which was never requested; and that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting evidence of a backpack filled with marijuana, which Gomez had picked-up
and was transporting along with his co-defendant.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
While on patrol at around 2:30 a.m. on April 27, 2015, Officer McCarthy saw
Gomez and his co-defendant, Ms. Thompson, parked behind businesses off of Fairview
Avenue in Boise. (Trial Tr., p.83, L.13 – p.86, L.13.) The area was secluded from the
public without access to residential areas or businesses, and there was no reason for
someone to be back there at 2:30 in the morning. (Id., p.84, Ls.1-13.) Officer McCarthy
made contact with the driver, later identified as Gomez, and his co-defendant, asking
them why they were parked back there. (Id., p.88, Ls.18-21.) Both were very nervous,
and their responses did not make sense. (Id., p.93, L.6 – p.94, L.14.) Dissatisfied with
their self-conflicting responses, both that they were going to see a friend and then that
the friend was coming to see them, Officer McCarthy had Gomez exit the vehicle and
questioned him and his co-defendant separately. (Id., p.88, L.22 – p.91, L.3.)
Meanwhile, a drug dog had arrived on scene and positively alerted to Gomez’s
car.

(Id., p.111, L.9 – p.113, L.9.)

A search of the vehicle revealed baggies of

methamphetamine in a makeup bag on the passenger floor board, in an eyeglass case
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in Ms. Thompson’s bra, and a separate baggie in her bra; a digital scale; loose
oxycodone pills; and a backpack containing marijuana in the vehicle’s trunk. (Id., p.101,
L.21 – p.102, L.5; p.114, L.2 – p.115, L.18; p.122, L.2 – p.123, L.6; p.128, L.25 – p.129,
L.14; p.135, Ls.2-7.) Officers recovered more than 20 grams of methamphetamine at
the scene; considerably more than a user amount. (Id., p.143, L.21 – p.144, L.13;
p.177, L.13 – p.180, L.11.)
Speaking only with Gomez, Officer McCarthy learned that Gomez was driving
Ms. Thompson around to run her errands. (Id., p.91, Ls.4-9; p.102, Ls.21-22.) After
confronting him with all the drugs they had found, Gomez initially claimed that he knew
nothing about the drugs found in the car. (Id., p.144, L.24 – p.145, L.12.) But he also
admitted that he was aware that his co-defendant possessed methamphetamine (id.,
p.148, L.13 – p.149, L.7); that he had smoked methamphetamine earlier with his codefendant (id., p.146, L.19 – p.147, L.2); and that he agreed to drive his co-defendant
around to pick up her things in exchange for some methamphetamine (id., p.146, Ls.118). Following his arrest and transport to the county jail, after being informed that he
would be searched and that any contraband he brought into the jail could be used as
the basis for additional charges, Gomez admitted that he had a pipe, which he earlier
used to smoke methamphetamine, in his underwear. (Id., p.149, L.18 – p.154, L.20.)
The pipe contained residue which later tested positive for methamphetamine.

(Id.,

p.154, Ls.8-15; p.186, L.19 – p.187, L.3.)
The state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine and possession
of paraphernalia, with a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., pp.23-24, 28-29.)

Gomez filed a motion to suppress both the evidence seized during the encounter with
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police and his various inculpatory statements, on the theory that police lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain Gomez.

(R., pp.58-64.)

The district court denied

Gomez’s suppression motion. (R., pp.84-88.)
Meanwhile, the state filed a motion in limine asking for a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of Gomez’s admission that on the day he was arrested, prior to his contact
with police, he had used his pipe to smoke methamphetamine, and on other evidence
indicative of Gomez’s knowledge of the presence of methamphetamine in the vehicle he
was driving. (R., pp.39-44.) The district court granted the motion in limine. (8/31/2016
Tr., p.43, L.22 – p.44, L.12.) The state also provided notice of its intention to introduce
what it classified as 404(b) evidence against the defendant; specifically, evidence of the
marijuana found in the backpack and the defendant’s statements with regards thereto.
(R., pp.78-79.) The district court ultimately concluded that the evidence was admissible.
(Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20.)
The case went to trial. (R., pp.92-96; Trial Tr.) Following the trial, the jury found
Gomez guilty of

both

possession

of

methamphetamine and

possession of

paraphernalia. (R., pp.116-17.) The district court entered judgment against Gomez and
sentenced him to a unified term of ten years with two years fixed on the possession of
methamphetamine, and a concurrent sentence of six months on the possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp.120-22.) Gomez filed a motion for reconsideration (R., p.125),
which the district court denied (R., pp.132-33). Gomez also filed a notice of appeal
timely from the judgment. (R., pp.126-27.)
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ISSUES
Gomez states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez’s constructive possession of Ms.
Thompson’s methamphetamine?
2.
Did the district court err when it failed to give a unanimity instruction
for the possession of methamphetamine charge?
3.
Did the district court err when it admitted evidence of the backpack
of marijuana?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez was guilty of possession of
methamphetamine?
2.
Has Gomez failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error by
not giving a specific unanimity instruction, which Gomez never requested below?
3.
Has Gomez failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of the backpack of marijuana?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury’s Conclusion That
Gomez Was Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine
A.

Introduction
The state charged Gomez with, inter alia, possession of methamphetamine. (R.,

pp.23-24.) At the conclusion of his trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge.
(R., p.117.) On appeal, Gomez argues that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to
convict him of possession of methamphetamine. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-12.) Review of
the trial record, however, demonstrates that the jury’s verdict is supported by competent
evidence presented at trial.
B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a

verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. The facts, and inferences to be
drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict.

Id.

In

determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial,
the Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to
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its ultimate admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct.
App. 2010).
C.

Gomez’s Conviction Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c) makes it a crime to possess any amount of a controlled

substance, such as methamphetamine. “Possession of a controlled substance may be
actual or constructive.” State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct.
App. 1994). Constructive possession is shown where the defendant has knowledge of
the controlled substance and the power and intent to control it. State v. Blake, 133
Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999). “Constructive possession may be joint or
exclusive.” Id. The state presented sufficient evidence whereby the jury could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez possessed methamphetamine under either
theory, whether actual or constructive.
First, the state presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Gomez had
actual possession of the methamphetamine residue on his pipe.

When he was

transported to jail, Gomez was asked if he had any contraband and informed that he
would be searched, and if anything illegal was found on his person, it would result in
additional criminal charges. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-14.) Gomez then admitted that he
had a meth pipe in his underwear. (Id., p.150, Ls.14-16.) The pipe was removed. (Id.,
p.150, Ls.22-24.) Gomez admitted that he used the pipe to smoke methamphetamine.
(Id., p.154, Ls.6-20; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 35:15 – 35:50.) Residue collected from
the pipe tested positive for methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.186, L.19 – p.187, L.3.)
Gomez’s admission that he used the pipe to consume methamphetamine is
sufficient evidence to show that Gomez knew the residue was methamphetamine.
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Gomez’s having the residue-containing pipe in his underwear is sufficient evidence to
show that Gomez had control over it. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence whereby
the jury could convict Gomez of possession of methamphetamine based on the residue
found on the glass pipe.1
Second, the state presented sufficient evidence whereby a jury could find that
Gomez actually possessed the methamphetamine found in his co-defendant’s bra.
During their search of the suspects and vehicle, officers located a baggie of
methamphetamine and/or an eyeglass case containing a baggie of methamphetamine
in Gomez’s co-defendant’s bra. (Id., p.122, L.10 – p.123, L.6.) Though Gomez denied
any knowledge of the drugs found on his co-defendant’s person, evidence was
presented that his co-defendant claimed that Gomez had in fact shoved the
methamphetamine down her bra in order to avoid criminal detection.2 (State’s Ex. 2 at
24:05 – 24:12.)
As noted above, the question of credibility is an issue for the trier of fact. Miller,
131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607.

Construing the statements in the light most

favorable to the verdict, this is sufficient evidence to show that Gomez had control over
1

On appeal, Gomez never appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he
possessed methamphetamine residue in his glass pipe. By itself, that is sufficient to
sustain his conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

2

In a footnote, Gomez argues that his co-defendant’s statements to police, placed
before the jury in an audio recording admitted at trial, were hearsay and that, in any
case, the state did not rely on them for its theory of the case. (Appellant’s brief, p.11,
n.4.) Neither assertion is relevant under the correct standard of review. First, as noted
above, at issue is what the evidence supports, Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at
607, not the state’s theory of the evidence. Second, when determining the sufficiency of
the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury
without regard to its ultimate admissibility. Moore, 148 Idaho at 894, 231 P.3d at 539.
Finally, the audio recording’s admissibility was not objected to at trial (Trial Tr., p.91,
L.25 – p.92, L.22), nor has it been challenged on appeal.
7

the methamphetamine found in Ms. Thompson’s bra. The jury could also infer a guilty
conscience from Gomez’s actions trying to dispose of the contraband, showing that he
knew what he had placed in Ms. Thompson’s bra. Thus, there was sufficient evidence
presented whereby the jury could convict Gomez of possession of methamphetamine
based on the drugs found in Ms. Thompson’s bra.
Third, the state presented sufficient evidence to show that Gomez had
constructive possession of the other packages of methamphetamine found during the
search of his car. While being questioned by police, Gomez admitted that he was
transporting his co-defendant and her drugs in exchange for methamphetamine. (Trial
Tr., p.146, Ls.7-18; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 18:00 – 19:25.) Gomez also told officers
that he was aware that his co-defendant possessed methamphetamine.

(Trial Tr.,

p.148, L.17 – p.149, L.7; see also State’s Ex. 2 at 26:50 – 28:25.) Gomez’s knowledge
that his co-defendant possessed a quantity of methamphetamine, along with his plan to
get paid in some portion of the drugs, is sufficient evidence whereby the jury could infer
that Gomez knew methamphetamine was present. Gomez’s driving of the vehicle in
order to transport the methamphetamine he knew was present shows his control over
the drugs. Alternatively, his belief he would be paid with a portion of the drugs shows
his intent to control at least that portion of the methamphetamine. Either way, sufficient
evidence was presented whereby the jury could convict Gomez of constructive
possession of methamphetamine based on the other packages of methamphetamine
found during the search of his car.
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Under any proper theory of this case,3 the state presented sufficient evidence to
show both Gomez’s knowledge and intent to control the methamphetamine found during
the police investigation.

Gomez’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to

convict him for possession of methamphetamine is without merit. The jury’s verdict
finding Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine should be affirmed.
II.
Gomez Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In His Unpreserved Claim That The
District Court Erred By Not Giving A Specific Unanimity Instruction
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Gomez asserts that the district court erred by not

giving a specific unanimity instruction regarding his possession of methamphetamine.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-20.) Gomez has failed to establish fundamental error entitling
him to review of this unpreserved issue.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654
(2000)).

“An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the

instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.” State v. Shackelford, 150
3

The prosecutor also argued during her closing that the jury could convict Gomez
based on his possession of the methamphetamine he admitted smoking the day prior to
his arrest. (Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.11-17.) For the reasons set forth below (see Arg. II),
because it involved criminal conduct separate from Gomez’s possession of
methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, this was not a proper theory to present to
the jury as a standalone basis for conviction absent a separate charge. Regardless,
that Gomez had smoked a substance he knew was methamphetamine is sufficient to
show both his knowledge and control over that methamphetamine.
9

Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459,
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).
C.

Gomez Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The District Court’s Not
Giving An Unrequested Specific Unanimity Instruction
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must

be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.” State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.3d at 865 (“An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on
appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This
same principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No party
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. Id.; see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Gomez did not request a specific unanimity instruction below. Thus, to prevail on
appeal, Gomez must show that omission of the unrequested instruction rises to the level
of fundamental error. To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
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Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Jury verdicts must be unanimous. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 375, 247
P.3d 582, 602 (2010); I.C.R. 31(a).

However, “[a]n instruction that the jury must

unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense … is generally not required.”
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) (quoting State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711, 215 P.3d 414, 431 (2009)).

The exception to this

general rule is when a defendant commits different criminal acts, each of which
constitute “separate incidents involving distinct unions of mens rea and actus reus.” Id.
at 475, 272 P.3d at 447. In other words, where there is a duplicitous charge. See State
v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 48, 89 P.3d 881, 888 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted)
(“[d]uplicity refers to the charging of more than one offense in a single count of the
charging document”).
In this case, the state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine,
alleging:
That the defendant, ANDREW SCOTT GOMEZ, on or about the
27th day of April, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully
possess a controlled substance, to-wit: Methamphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.
(R., p.24.) There is no duplicity in the charge itself, and Gomez would be entitled to no
specific unanimity instruction on that basis. However, as noted by Gomez (Appellant’s
brief, pp.14-15), during closing statements the prosecutor argued that the jury could
convict Gomez of possession on three separate theories: first, based on Gomez’s
admission “that he smoked methamphetamine earlier” (Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.11-17);
second, based on his transporting his co-defendant and her drugs in exchange for a
portion of those drugs (id., p.219, L.18 – p.220, L.3); and third, based on his actual
11

possession of a pipe containing methamphetamine residue (id., p.220, Ls.4-25). Each
theory will be addressed below.
1.

Both Gomez’s Possession Of The Methamphetamine Residue Found On
His Pipe And The Baggies Of Methamphetamine He Was Transporting
With His Co-Defendant Were Part Of The Same Criminal Incident

On appeal Gomez argues, inter alia, that possessing both methamphetamine
residue on his pipe and the baggies of crystal methamphetamine he was transporting
with his co-defendant constitutes separate acts of possession of methamphetamine.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.) It does not.
This issue is controlled by the Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v. Southwick,
158 Idaho 173, 345 P.3d 232 (2014). In that case, the state alleged that Southwick
possessed methamphetamine, and presented alternative theories to the jury that she
constructively possessed crystals found in baggies in the passenger compartment,
and/or residue found on paraphernalia, i.e., a digital scale. Id. at 182, 345 P.3d at 241.
The Court determined that these theories constituted alternative factual means by which
the element of possession could be proved, not independent crimes.

Id.

The

possession happened at the same time, in the same location, as part of the same
criminal incident. Id. The record did not indicate “a distinct union of mens rea and actus
reus separated by a discrete period of time or circumstance for the two alleged acts of
possession.” Id. Therefore, that Southwick had possessed the methamphetamine in
two specific locations did not indicate two separate crimes. Id.
In this case, the state charged Gomez with possession of methamphetamine
without alleging a specific factual theory underlying that possession. (See R., pp.2324.) At trial, the state presented alternative theories that Gomez committed that crime
12

by, inter alia, (1) constructively possessing methamphetamine residue in the baggies
found on his passenger and around the passenger compartment, and/or (2) by actually
possessing the methamphetamine residue found on his paraphernalia, i.e., a meth pipe.
(See Trial Tr., p.218, L.17 – p.221, L.9.) As in Southwick, both of these theories arose
from the same criminal incident. The specific location where Gomez possessed his
drugs, whether in his glove compartment, in the trunk of his vehicle, in his hip pocket, or
anywhere else in the car is irrelevant.

That he possessed both baggies of crystal

methamphetamine and methamphetamine residue on his pipe constitutes the crime of
possessing a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine; it does not constitute
multiple criminal acts of possession.4
Even had Gomez requested a specific unanimity instruction for the prosecutor’s
alternative theories that Gomez possessed methamphetamine by actually possessing
the residue-containing pipe and/or by constructively possessing the drugs he was
transporting with this co-defendant, he would not have been entitled to one. Gomez has
failed to show error in the district court’s omitting an instruction to which he was not
entitled. He has therefore failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of this
unpreserved claim of error.
2.

Gomez’s Possession Of Methamphetamine, Based On His Smoking
Methamphetamine Earlier, Arose From A Separate Criminal Incident

Gomez was not entitled to a specific unanimity instruction where both the
methamphetamine residue and crystals were discovered during the investigation of the
4

This is especially true in drug cases where criminal penalties are graded to the total
weight of the illegal substance, not the number of packages containing the substance.
See I.C. § 37-2732B.
13

same criminal incident. However, the state agrees that the methamphetamine Gomez
admitted consuming earlier in the day was not part of that same incident. By telling the
jurors that they could convict Gomez on the standalone theory that he had possessed
methamphetamine when consuming it earlier, in an incident apparently unrelated to the
investigation of the vehicle, the prosecutor introduced duplicity into the charge. In that
circumstance, the giving of a specific unanimity instruction would have been among the
severable possible remedies available to cure the error.
Gomez, however, cannot show that the error of which he complains (the lack of a
specific unanimity instruction) was clear—in the sense that defense counsel’s failure to
request a specific unanimity instruction was not a tactical decision.

Because the

prosecutor injected some error into the proceedings, Gomez was entitled to some
remedy. But rather than request a specific unanimity instruction, allowing the jury to
convict his client of possession on either the theory that he used methamphetamine
earlier (which he admitted) or on the theory that he possessed methamphetamine at the
time he was seized in his vehicle (for which there was overwhelming evidence), defense
counsel chose instead to take the “use” theory off the table. At the beginning of his
closing argument, counsel explained to the jury:
Now, there is no question that Andrew Gomez was a user of
methamphetamine. In fact, again as Ms. Wager pointed out per his own
admission they had smoked a bowl earlier in the evening. He was a user.
No question.
In getting back to the elements again. Was he knowingly in
possession of methamphetamine when he smoked that bowl? Of course.
You can’t smoke a bowl of methamphetamine and not know you possess
it.

14

The problem is he is not being charged with being a user. And he
is not being charged with what he did earlier in the evening. He is being
charged with knowingly and [sic] possessing methamphetamine at the
time of his arrest when they show up at the scene at the car.
(Trial Tr., p.223, L.16 – p.224, L.6.) Defense counsel made the tactical decision to cure
the error, not by requesting a specific unanimity instruction which would have kept the
“use” theory on the table, but by removing that theory altogether.
Gomez has also failed to carry his burden of showing that the error prejudiced
him. First, as shown above, the weight of evidence establishing that Gomez possessed
methamphetamine under the proper theories of this case was overwhelming. (See Arg.
I, supra.)
Moreover, in a proper closing argument, evidence that Gomez had used his pipe
to smoke methamphetamine earlier would have still played a key role because Gomez’s
use of the pipe to consume methamphetamine established his guilt on both of his
charges: That he earlier used the pipe to smoke methamphetamine showed that he
knew the residue in the pipe was methamphetamine, which proved his actual
possession of the methamphetamine residue. That he actually used the pipe to smoke
methamphetamine also demonstrated that he intended to use the pipe to consume a
controlled substance, thus establishing possession of paraphernalia.
The prosecutor’s assertion that the jury could convict Gomez of possessing
methamphetamine based directly on his admission to having used his pipe to smoke the
drugs earlier in the day was erroneous. But considering the way in which defense
counsel properly sought to cure that error during closing argument; in addition to the
weight of evidence of Gomez’s guilt based on any of the proper alternative theories; in
addition to the central role Gomez’s use of the pipe to smoke methamphetamine earlier
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in the day would play in any closing argument, Gomez is not able to show that the
outcome of his trial would have been any different had the district court given the
(unsolicited) specific unanimity instruction. He has therefore failed to show fundamental
error entitling him to review of this unpreserved claim of error.
III.
Gomez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting
Evidence That Gomez Was Transporting A Backpack Filled With Marijuana
A.

Introduction
Gomez challenges the district court’s evidentiary ruling admitting evidence of the

marijuana discovered in the backpack Gomez was transporting, along with all of the
methamphetamine, with his co-defendant. (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-26.) Gomez argues
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as propensity evidence, asserting
that the state failed to provide a sufficient offer of proof to show a proper basis for
admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b). (Id.)
Gomez’s argument, whatever its merits, is irrelevant. While it is true that the
state sought admission of the marijuana evidence under Rule 404(b) (see R., pp.78-79),
that was not the basis on which the district court granted admission. Rather, it admitted
the evidence because it was res gestae. (See Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20.) Gomez has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that
Gomez was also transporting a backpack of marijuana.
B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009)
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(citations omitted). “In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will
grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
C.

Under The Circumstances Of This Case, Evidence That Gomez Was
Transporting Marijuana With His Co-Defendant Was Part Of The Entire Picture
Of Gomez’s Crime Of Possession Of Methamphetamine
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in conformity therewith.” I.R.E. 404(b). An exception to the Rule 404(b)
prohibition of other misconduct evidence is res gestae, or the “complete story principle,”
where “the charged act and the uncharged act are so inseparably connected that the
jury cannot be given a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime without
reference to the uncharged misconduct.” State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19, 878
P.2d 188, 193 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in State v. Izatt,
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975):
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of the
circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an account also
implicates the defendant or defendants in the commission of other crimes
for which they have not been charged, the evidence is nevertheless
admissible. The jury is entitled to base its decision upon a full and
accurate description of the events concerning the whole criminal act,
regardless of whether such a description also implicates a defendant in
other criminal acts.
See also McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (7th ed. 1999) (“other-crime evidence should
be admissible to complete the story…when the material in question is necessary to a
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fair understanding of the behavior of the individuals involved in the criminal enterprise or
the events immediately leading up to them.”) (footnotes omitted).
In this case, the district court determined that “[t]he marijuana in the trunk [was]
admissible,” explaining:
The issue of course is possession. It is all part of the same act, same
scene, and it is relevant and admissible. And I don’t think any prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value. I think it is part of the entire picture in
this case. It is relevant to the issues brought before the jury.
(Trial Tr., p.6, Ls.15-20.) The district court was correct. In exchange for some portion
of the methamphetamine, Gomez agreed to transport his co-defendant and her drugs.
(Id., p.146, Ls.7-18.) Part of those drugs was a backpack filled with marijuana that
Gomez and his co-defendant picked up en route. (Id., p.147, L.7 – p.148, L.10.) The
marijuana was therefore res gestae, or, as the district court articulated it, “part of the
entire picture in this case.”
Gomez does not challenge the district court’s actual ruling below, instead arguing
that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). (Appellant’s brief, pp.21-26.)
But (as noted above) res gestae is an exception to Rule 404(b). See Blackstead, 126
Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193. Because Gomez has failed to challenge the actual basis
for the district court’s evidentiary ruling, this Court should affirm the district court on that
unchallenged basis. See State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311,
1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998).
Even had the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the
marijuana, such error would have been harmless. An erroneous evidentiary ruling is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it did not contribute to the verdict. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). The jury did not find Gomez
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guilty of possession of methamphetamine because he was also transporting a backpack
of marijuana. The jury found him guilty of possessing methamphetamine because, as
shown above (Argument I, supra), there was overwhelming evidence that Gomez was
guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Evidence that Gomez was also transporting
marijuana with his co-defendant would not have affected the outcome of this trial and,
therefore, even if erroneous, admission of evidence regarding the marijuana was
necessarily harmless.
The district court correctly admitted evidence that Gomez was transporting, along
with the methamphetamine, marijuana with his co-defendant because it was res gestae.
Gomez has failed to challenge the actual basis for the district court’s evidentiary ruling
and it should therefore be affirmed on that unchallenged basis. Even if the district court
admitted the evidence erroneously, such error was necessarily harmless. The judgment
of the district court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Gomez’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 9th day of November, 2016.

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer_________
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of November, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic
copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

RJS/dd

_/s/ Russell J. Spencer_______
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General

20

